Abstract

Despite a widely held belief that delegates from the Lower South succeeded at the Constitutional Convention as extremists, we argue that delegates from the Lower South were more often successful when their interests were mainstream. Our argument proceeds using a two dimensional map of delegate preferences at the Constitutional Convention, estimated using a new dataset on delegate votes, multiple imputation, and optimal classi cation. We argue that states closer to the center of a vote { measured by the average distance of a delegation to the nay-side, bloc median line { was more likely to be on the winning side than a delegation less mainstream. We establish this relationship using regression analysis then apply it to two substantive issues, one where the Lower South succeeded and the other where it largely failed.

1 Introduction

What the Lower South (South Carolina and Georgia) achieved at the Constitutional Convention is quite surprising. The Constitution initially prohibited a ban on the slave trade until 1808, it guaranteed fugitive slaves would be returned to their masters, and it prevented export tari s.[1] It also provided a louder voice for the Lower South in the U.S. House of Representatives by including three- fths of slaves in the apportionment of the House. The latter agitated northerners and later lead extreme New England Federalists, such as Timothy Pickering and William Plummer, to propose succeeding from the union (McDonald 2000, 61).

The Lower South states of South Carolina and Georgia were dependent on slaves, imported from Africa, for indigo and rice production that was largely exported to the West Indies. Slaves in these states were roughly half the population. Other southern states were more heavily invested in tobacco with slaves closer to a third of their populations. Other than New Hampshire and Massachusetts, no two state coalition voted together more often than the Lower South, which might explain why McDonald (1958) and Jillson and Anderson (1978) treat them as a regional bloc.

Despite the widely accepted view that the Lower South was more successful at the Constitutional Convention than their position warranted, delegates from the Lower South were less successful at getting their motions passed than northern delegates and no more likely to be on the winning side of a vote.[2] Delegates from ve of the twelve states attending the Convention made 78% of the recorded motions: Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina. Among those states, South Carolina was clearly the least

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[1]In per capita gures, southern exports were roughly twice the size of northern exports, giving the South, especially the Lower South, a strong interest in prohibiting export taxes.

[2]Treating Delaware northward as the North, the Lower South passed 35% of its motions compared to 41% for the North across the 397 roll call in our dataset (described later) { though the di erence is not statistically signi cant. Furthermore, the average state from the Lower South was on the winning side of an issue on 75% of the votes, while the average state from the North was on the winning side on 76% of those votes.

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theory might explain the Lower South's success on votes related to export tariffs while it failed on many votes related to apportionment.

Because the Congress of the Confederation largely created policy, not new institutions, it could not appeal to preferences on the strength of the national government, which may explain why the Lower South partially succeeded at the Constitutional Convention when it continually failed in the Congress of the Confederation. Such an explanation differs from the traditional account of northerners conceding to the will of extremists (Davis 1977; Riker 1987; Kaminski 1995; Beeman 2009).

2 Background: The South in Congress and the Grand Convention

Regional divisions between the North and South slowly formed in the Congress during the Articles of Confederation (Jillson and Wilson 1994). Northern and Southern states differed over issues related to the debt, the issuance of additional requisitions, and international trade. These tensions climaxed in 1786 when John Jay, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, asked Congress to clarify its instructions about a treaty he was negotiating with Spain. Spain blockaded American ships from the mouth of the Mississippi River, inhibiting southern commerce. At the same time, Northerners wanted Jay to negotiate a commercialuth

Southern states, Maryland southward, voted against.[5] The vote illustrated why the South would continuously lose if decisions were made along purely sectional lines.

Jillson and Wilson's (1994) multidimensional scaling of delegate votes in the Congress of the Confederation illustrates the polarization in Congress at the time. Sectional issues were so dominant in 1786 and 1787 that Congress divided itself into two disjoint clusters, a northern cluster and a southern one, along the primary dimension of voting. Votes on the Jay Treaty ran straight across the dimension, leaving southern states at the mercy of the North.

2.1 Voting Rules and Coalitions

Both the Congress of the Confederation and the Constitutional Convention voted using state blocs, with each state delegation casting one vote. The size of each state delegation varied depending upon the number of delegates each state appointed. When an issue was raised, the position of each state was determined by a majority of it's delegates. In the event of a tie, the state's vote was recorded as divided. Unlike bloc voting in the Congress of the Confederation, a motion passed at the Constitutional Convention if more states voted yea than nay and a quorum of seven states was attained. In the Congress of the Confederation, minor issues passed with seven a rmative votes (a majority of the states) and major issues passed with nine a rmative votes (thee-fourths of the states).

It should be no surprise that the system did not favor southern states, particularly states from the Lower South. Northern states consistently held a majority of the state votes in both Congress and the Constitutional Convention. If we categorize Delaware northward as northern states, then eight of the confederation's thirteen states where northern and ve

is at the same time that the South was failing in Congress, it seemed to succeed at the Constitutional Convention. Certainly, the loss of two northern states helped the Lower South.

The dominant explanation for the success of the Lower South at the Convention seems to be that the North made compromises with the Lower South to keep it committed to the development of a new constitution (Davis 1977; Riker 1987; Kaminski 1995; Beeman 2009). The nineteenth century abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison described the relationship as an \unholy alliance" because it led to the protection of the slave trade and prevented the nation from abolishing slavery. William Riker (1987), a prominent political scientist, agreed that Northerners made concessions for the South to help attain the supermajority of states required for rati cation. Although this may explain a number of key votes, like the alleged vote trade between the delegates from South Carolina and Connecticut over the requirement of a two-thirds majority to pass navigation acts in exchange for a protection of the slave trade (Hutson 1987a; McGuire 2007), we argue that concessions are not the whole story. Like Jillson and Wilson (1994), we nd one of the major issues of con ict at the Convention was sectional. The other was over the strength of the national government, Aldrich's (1995) \great principle." Di erent delegates represented the states at the Constitutional Convention than in the Congress of the Confederation and these delegates faced institutional decisions, where the strength of the national government was at stake. When the Lower South was extreme at the Constitutional Convention, it typically lost, as it had done in the Congress of the Confederation. When it won sectional issues, the issue was typically tied to the relative strength of the national government, making the Lower South more mainstream. The Lower South's ability to tie issues to preferences on the strength of the national government may explain why it succeeded at the Convention while it failed in Congress.

3   A Spatial Map of the Convention

could be tied to a particular roll call on a particular day. For example, Luther Martin (MD) was coded as voting no on vote 368, a motion to prevent the federal government from interfering with the slave trade until 1808, because he explicitly said he voted against the clause in a letter to his general assembly. He made statements consistent with that coding during the Convention's debates (Farrand 1966, 2:364, 3:211-12). Third, after the positions of the delegates were recovered, attendance records were re-consulted to determine whether additional delegate votes could be inferred from the state's vote and the fact that each state's vote was determined by a majority of its delegates. For example, Maryland was recorded as a yea on vote 368. Because John Mercer was absent and Luther Martin was coded as nay, the three remaining Maryland delegates, Daniel Carroll, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer, and James McHenry, must have voted yea in order for a majority of the Maryland delegation to vote yea. See Dougherty et al. (2012) and Heckelman and Dougherty (2013) for a more thorough description of their data recovery project.

We estimate delegate preferences using this data, multiple imputation, and optimal classi cation (Poole 2000). Optimal classi cation unfolds binary data using a non-parametric procedure which rst estimates an optimal cut line for each vote, then optimally classi es voters in the regions formed by the cut lines.[7] The process is then iterated until the number of classi cation errors are minimized { i.e. the number of times an ideal point for a delegate voting yea (resp. nay) on the nay side (resp. yea side) of a cut line is the smallest. The resultant scaling places those who voted similarly more closely together than those who voted more dissimilarly. Unlike ADA or ACU scores, there is nothing in the procedure that de nes the recovered dimensions *ex ante*. Instead, the substantive content of each dimension must be interpreted *ex post*. This allows the researcher to \learn" what the voting pattern implies rather than to force a scale on the dimensions.

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[7]A cut line demarcates the space between individual who prefer the status quo and individuals who prefer the proposal on any pairwise vote. With Euclidean preferences, assumed here, the cut line is perpendicular to a line connecting the proposal and the status quo and it intersects such a line at its midpoint.

To prevent delegates with only a few votes from affecting the location of the cut lines, we excluded delegates with 10 or fewer inferred votes from the optimal classification routine. Of the 55 delegates at the Convention, 42 had more than 10 votes. Among them, five had between 12 and 20 inferred votes and five others had more than 200 inferred votes. The average roll call had only 10.3 yea or nay codes.

Because there are many missing observations in the roll call matrix, a skree plot of the double-centered agreement score matrix does not help us determine the appropriate number of dimensions (Poole 2005, p. 151). Instead, we have to consider other measures. See Rosenthal and Voeten (2004) for a similar problem. One method is to compare the aggregate proportional reduction in error (APRE) for each additional dimension. *Ex ante*, APRE scores must increase with each additional dimension (similar to an R^2 increasing with each additional independent variable). Hence, one would not attempt to maximize the APRE. Instead, a researcher would select the appropriate number of dimensions based on improvements in the APRE. In our case, a one dimensional scaling has an APRE of $.551$, a two dimensional scaling has an APRE of $.758$, and three dimension scaling has and APRE of $.892$. Because the APRE of the scaling improved by 38% going from one to two dimensions, but only by 18% going to three dimensions, we decided that two dimensions adequately scales the votes. Two dimensions correctly classifies 92.6% of the 4,102 choices. That is, it correctly puts the 43 delegates on the yea or nay side of the cut line 92.6% of the time there is a yea or nay vote. Three dimensions correctly classifies only 96.7% of the votes. Using the votes recorded for the state blocs alone, Pope and Treier (2012) argue that the Convention could be scaled with two or three dimensions but decided to proceed with two, as done here.[8]

The estimated locations of the 42 delegates are depicted with solid markers in Figure 1. The location of delegates from the Southern states are depicted by gray triangles while delegates from Northern states are depicted by blue circles. One of the insights of the scaling

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[8]Keep in mind that higher dimensional votes are not lost in the scaling. They are simply scaled along with the other votes on the reported dimensions.

is that it provides a glimpse of the major underlying issues at the Convention. Scholars have

but appears on the left. New Hampshire may *seem* misplaced, but its delegates did not attend the Convention until July 23 — well after most of the small-state and large-state differences were resolved. Put differently, we may accurately label the first dimension as capturing localist and nationalist tendencies, but that does not mean the dimension captures localism and nationalism exclusively. It appears to capture the small-state vs large-state divide as well, which others have treated as a separate dimension (Pope and Treier 2012). The fact that votes on apportioning the U.S. Senate typically ran roughly parallel to this dimension reinforces our claim.

The second dimension appears to show variation among the delegates over sectional issues, with the North at the top of the figure and the South at the bottom. The pattern is easily discernable from the solid gray triangles for the South and the solid blue circles for the North. With the exception of Elbridge Gerry, at the lower middle of the figure, and some overlap of Northern and Southern delegates at the center of the figure, the distinction between Northern and Southern delegates is quite clean. Lower South delegates such as John Rutledge and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney are near the bottom-right of the figure, while Gouvernor Morris and James Wilson, who openly confronted the South on issues of slavery, are shown near the top. Although few "empirical studies" have identified sectional differences as one of the major dimensions of conflict at the Convention,[10] sectional differences have been repeatedly stressed by historians (Davis 1977; Kaminski 1995; Beeman 2009), they were a major dimension of conflict in the Congress of the Confederation (Henderson 1974; Jillson and Wilson 1994), and they are consistent with Madison's claim that "the great division of interests ... did not lie between the large & small States: it lay between the Northern and Southern" (Farrand 1966, 1:486).

Our scaling quantifies the relative distances between delegates and allows us to address more fine-grained questions about the Convention. While it is well known that Luther Martin and James Madison held very different views, our scaling quantifies the extent of

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[10]For an important exception see Jillson and Anderson (1977)

their disagreement. For example, the distance between Martin and Madison is more than twice the distance between Martin and his co-delegate Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer. The scaling also helps us locate lesser known delegates like John Blair and William Davie, who appear in the center of the gure.

To get the 13 excluded delegates back into the gure, we imputed additional voelegates

tends to impute votes only for roll calls with a large number of observed yea or nay codes. In our case, the method imputed votes for only 33 of our 397 roll calls { the same roll calls for each imputation. After votes were imputed for all delegates on the 33 roll calls, we removed votes imputed for delegates who did not attend. This prevented us from assigning a yea or nay position to someone who was not there. Because William C. Houston (NJ) and George Wythe (VA) attended only the first two weeks of the Convention, the technique imputed only one addition vote for each. As a result, we drop both delegates from the remainder of the analysis. Because they voted on less than 4% of the votes in our data and the roll call mesh was fixed prior to imputation, this decision has almost no affect on our results. Among the remaining 11 delegates, our multiple imputation procedure, with deletions for non-attendance, produced an average of 29 yea or nay codes per delegate with Pierce having the least, 12 codes, and Fitzsimons having the most, 39 codes.

We ran the imputation procedure 40 times. For each imputed matrix, which now contains a combination of imputed and observed votes, we placed the excluded 11 delegates (13 minus Houston and Wythe) into the roll call mesh using Poole's legislator procedure. This procedure positions a delegate in a fixed classification region that minimizes the delegate's classification errors. We then identified the five imputations which minimized total classification errors and created five locations for each of the 11 delegates (one location for each of the five best sets of imputed data). We then reported the average location for each of the 11 delegates across the five imputations as their ideal point. The locations are marked in Figure 1 by hollow blue circles for northern delegates and hollow gray triangles for southern delegates.

who are known for their nationalistic stances, appear toward the right of the gure, while delegates like William Pierce (GA) are correctly placed among delegates from the Lower South { providing some face validity for the imputed locations. As an additional measure of t we calculated how each state would vote if delegates vote based on their side of the cut line, then compared the predicted votes for each state to the observed votes for each delegation. Our model correctly predicts 73% of the yea or nay votes recorded for each state. A Bayesian IRT model produced similar distributions of ideal points for the delegates but had other limitations.[13]

4   Theory: Distance from the Center

We now use this scaling to calculate \bloc median lines" for each roll and to determine whether an actor's success is related to his distance from the nay-side, bloc median line. Recall that in a single dimension with N voting individuals (N odd) and Euclidean preferences, an alternative at the median voter cannot be defeated using pair-wise majority rule (Black 1948; Hinich and Munger 1997). Furthermore, any status quo that is not at the median can be defeated by a proposal closer to the median. With perfect spatial voting, the median voter is always on the winning side of the issue because his/her vote is necessary for a motion to pass.

In two dimensional space, the conditions for equilibrium are quite rare (Plott 1967; McKelvey 1976). Nevertheless, we can use the concept of a median line to help us predict whether a proposal will pass. Any straight line L partitions the set of ideal points into three subsets: those that lie on one side of L, those that lie on the other side of L, and those that lie on L itself. A median line partitions the set of ideal points so that no more than half of the ideal

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[13]Our Bayesian IRT model includes many of the same covariates in the prior for all 55 delegates. Like any Bayesian model it imputes missing votes conditioned upon prior distributions, covariates, and observed L

points lie on either side (Davis et al. 1972; Godfrey at al. 2011; Miller 2014). Suppose there are two alternatives (the status quo q and the proposal p). The median line associated with (q, p) has properties *somewhat* similar to median points in unidimensional space. For any (q, p), the median line associated with (q, p) is the median line perpendicular to line segment

will be on the yea side of the vote, the proposal will pass, and the ideal points on M_2 will be on the winning (yea) side of the vote. In all three cases, the delegates with ideal points on M_2 will be on the winning side.[20] The case where the yea side of the vote is below the cut line can be analyzed similarly.

If delegates *on* the nay-side, bloc median line are always on the winning side of a perfect spatial vote, then it stands to reason that delegates closer to the nay-side, bloc median line are more likely to be on the winning side than delegates farther away. In Figure 3.D, for example, delegate X is closer to M_2 than delegates Y or Z. If a potential cut line started at M_2 and moved continuously in a parallel fashion down and to the left of M_2 (not shown), X would be on the same side of the cut line as M_2 for most of these cut lines, making it on the winning side most of the time. The cut line would have to be moved considerably further down and to the left for Z to be on the same side of the cut line as M_2 (i.e., for Z to win). If, in contrast, the cut line moved in a parallel fashion up and to the right of M_2, X would always be on the same side of the cut line as M_2, meaning it would always be on the winning side. Y would be on the opposite side of the cut line (i.e. losing) for many of the parallel cut lines, except those that passed through Y or were further top-right from it. It is for this reason that the distance of a delegate to the nay-side, bloc median line should be associated with a delegate's success. Without knowing the exact location of q and p, delegates closer to that line would be more likely to win than delegates farther away from that line. Closer delegations should be more likely to win as well.

4.3   Observed Distance and Success

A quick glance at Figure 1 suggests that delegates like William Davie (NC) or Daniel Carroll (MD) are near the center of the space. This makes them mainstream on almost any vote. Other delegates, like John Dickinson (DE) or Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (SC) are not in

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[20]Suppose the status quo were between M_1 and M_2, but M_2 was closer to p than to q. In this case, M_1 would be the nay-side, bloc median line, changing the vantage of the analysis.

the center of the space but they could be in the center of a vote if they were close to the

nay-side, bloc median lines on angles between   90   and   50   or angles greater than 80 . These angles are consistent with the depiction in Figure 4.

[Figure 5 here]

Across roll calls, South Carolina and Georgia were most likely to vote with New Hampshire (when it attended), Massachusetts, and North Carolina (McDonald 1958; Jillson and Anderson 1978). However, the angle of the vote had small a ects on the loyalties of these states. Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Delaware were much more likely to vote with South Carolina and Georgia on angles between 0   and 50 , which we might call *sweet* angles for the Lower South, than on angles between   90   and   50   or angles greater than 90 , which we might call *bitter* angles for the Lower South.[21] Among these three states, the votes of Connecticut and Pennsylvania were more likely to change the position of the Lower South from losing to winning than the support of Delaware.[22] It appears that an advantage of the *sweet*

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two, to reﬂect the nature of bloc voting. For the reasons described in the previous section, shorter distances reﬂect more mainstream stances on the issue given the trajectory of the

extreme. Second, for cases where the Lower South motioned (the red line), the probability it would win is more responsive to distances, as shown by the sharp decline in the predicted probability for distances near 0.4. The two results suggest that the Lower South was more likely to be on the winning side of a vote when it was closer to the nay-side, bloc median line. That is, it was more successful as a centrist. The effect is pronounced, over the range of our data, for cases where the Lower South motions. Third, and perhaps most sticking, motioning significantly reduced the Lower South's chances of success for all observed distances greater than 0.4. This can be seen by noting the confidence intervals do not overlap for distances between 0.4 and 1.2, the blue line is below the red line over this range, and the greatest distance in our data was 0.84. The result might suggest that the Convention generally frowned on proposals made by the Lower South.

The strength of this relationship can be better appreciated by comparing it to similar results for Pennsylvania-Virginia (see Table 1, column (2)). The results in this column are very similar to those we described for the Lower South, except debate length is now negative and significant as expected, suggesting that more debate was associated with a smaller probability of Pennsylvania and Virginia from landing on the winning side. In addition, sectional unity votes did not dampen the success of the Pennsylvania-Virginia coalition, perhaps because the two states straddled the two sections and were less likely to vote together on contentious sectional issues.

More importantly, the distance to the nay-side, bloc median line had a different effect on the probability of winning for Pennsylvania-Virginia than it did for the Lower South (see Figure 6.B). Because the predicted probabilities are fairly close to one over the range of observed distances, 0.15 to 0.65 for both types of motioners the Pennsylvania-Virginia coalition was likely to win regardless of its distance. In addition, the lack of separation between the red and blue lines suggests that motioning did not have a negative effect on the success of Pennsylvania and Virginia, as it did for South Carolina and Georgia. Pennsylvania

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Why then was three- fths clause created? Although some readers may think that the three- fths compromise was invented late in the Convention to overcome some impasse between the North and South, it was initially created twelve days after voting began. When the idea was raised on June 11, the Convention was trying to outline an \equitable ratio" of apportionment for the legislature. John Rutledge and Pierce Butler of South Carolina proposed apportioning the legislature according to the quota of contribution from each state. Perhaps cognizant of how much support their proposal could gain and wanting to establish a di erent principle, James Wilson (PA) quickly interrupted with another idea. In vote 39, he proposed that the equitable ratio should be \the whole number of white & other free Citizens & inhabitants of every age sex & condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years and *three- fths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description* except Indians not paying taxes, in each State" (emphasis added, Farrand 1966, 1: 201). His proposal passed nine states to two, with only New Jersey and Delaware opposed. Wilson may have chosen three- fths as the initial ratio because a majority of states in Congress agreed to apportion requisitions according to this ratio in 1783 (United States 1910, 24: 215). In other words, he might have proposed it because he thought it would pass. No friend of slavery, Wilson may have then hoped the Convention would eventually reduce the ratio of slaves but keep popular apportionment. Madison agreed that the Convention should x a standard and suggested the details should be worked out by a committee (Farrand 1966, 1:

Southern delegates would try to improve their position from this mark, and northern delegates would try to curb it back, but ultimately their attempts to expand or contract the three- fths clause failed.

The clause was revisited on July 11, when Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and Pierce Butler, co-delegates from South Carolina, proposed to strike out three- fths clause and replace it with an apportionment that treated \Blacks" equal to \Whites" (their terminology).[28] This did not mean that they were ready to give Blacks the same rights as Whites. It meant that they wanted to count Blacks as 5=5ths in the apportionment rather than 3=5ths. The trajectory of the vote was 57 , putting South Carolina and Georgia on the extreme. South Carolina and Georgia were the farthest states from the nay-side, bloc median line at :83 and :74 units, respectively. The average state was :33 units away. As it turns out, both northern and southern delegates spoke against the proposal and vote 132 failed three states to seven.

Four votes later, the Convention tried to formally agree to include three- fths of Blacks in the apportionment. This motion failed four states to six. Clearly, the Convention was willing to let the three- fths clause on the table to keep other principles of apportionment o , but they were not prepared to conceded the three- fths ratio, at least not yet. Again, this vote was at a trajectory of 23 , making South Carolina and Georgia the farthest states from the nay-side, bloc median line. Rufus291(bl5=ng)-278-423(line7(as)-ri)279(3(line.)-2559 -e)-275(medion)-2568l

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an outright prohibition of export taxes was dear to the Lower South, the underlying issue

6   Conclusion

The 1790 census showed the practical e ects of the three- fths clause. New Hampshire was entitled to four seats in the rst U.S. House of Representatives because it had 140,000

were likely to be latent to the issues considered by the Congress of the Confederation at the same time. In this sense, it is possible that delegates voted sincerely, and still supported the Lower South on some issues which it won.

Although characterizing Southern delegates as centrists on any issue may seem odd, Southerners have been centrists during other periods in American history. A disproportionate number of moderate Senators were from the South in the rst three Congresses,[31] and Southerners were centrists on several issues at the Constitutional Convention. They may have gained in uence in U.S. politics, not because of their brinkmanship or work to form unholy alliances, but because on a few occasions their ideas appealed to the center of the voting body.

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[31]Despite representing only 38 40% of the states in the rst Senates, DW-NOMINATE scores suggest that Southerners controlled 40% of the seats in the center quintile in the First Senate, 60% in the Second Senate, and 67% in the Third Senate, <http://voteview.com/dwnominate.asp>.

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# Figure 1: Delegates at the Constitutional Convention

Figure 2: State Medians on the First Dimension

Figure 3: Median Lines, Bloc Median Lines, and Success

A. Median Line (odd number of voters)

B. Median Lines (even number of voters)

Figure 4: Trajectory of the Vote and the Extremism of the Lower South

A. The Lower South as Centrists

B. The Lower South as Extremists

Figure 5: Distance of Four Separate States and the Angle of the Vote

Table 1: The Probability of Success and the Distance to the Nay-Side, Bloc Median

	(1) SC-GA wins	(2) PA-VA wins	(3) SC-GA wins
SC-GA distance	-2.711 (1.162)		
SC-GA motioned	0.357 (1.792)		-2.099 (0.512)
SC-GA (distance motioned)	-5.844 (3.629)		
PA-VA distance		-4.874 (2.066)	
PA-VA motioned		-1.540 (1.283)	
PA-VA (distance motioned)		2.338 (3.396)	
degrees from 25			-0.019 (0.006)
northern state margin	-0.297 (0.373)	0.015 (0.337)	-0.091 (0.354)
temperature	0.005 (0.034)	-0.028 (0.030)	-0.009 (0.032)
debate length	0.032 (0.025)	-0.049 (0.024)	0.028 (0.022)
sectional unity vote	-1.775 (0.548)	0.742 (0.508)	-1.808 (0.533)
*j*state vote margin*j*	0.175	0.712	